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Abstract 
Much of the academic debate concerning the function of the Margin of Appreciation (MoA) 
doctrine is based on the assumption that democracy works more or less well and therefore any 
impugned domestic policy merits respect. The role of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) should therefore be secondary, confined to the rare situations when the democratic 
process fails and the national courts refrain from rescuing it. This debate assumes that the causes 
of democratic failures are internal, or that domestic decision-making processes are sufficiently 
resilient to outside pressure. This is obviously wrong, and more so today than in any other time in 
the history of the modern state. The aim of this essay is to explore these external challenges to 
democracy and their implications to the role of the ECtHR in protecting human rights. These 
responses demonstrate the limits of the MoA doctrine and highlight its alternative, subsidiarity, as 
a superior doctrine to manage the interface between the domestic and the European components 
of the European human rights regime. 
 
1. Introduction: The Margin of Appreciation doctrine and the internal failures of the political 
process 
The Margin of Appreciation (MoA) debate has tended to focus on the question of who should 
promote human rights standards: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the member 
states. Much of the academic debate about the function of the MoA is grounded in the assumption 
that democracy works more or less well. Hence, any impugned domestic policy can be assumed to 
have benefited from meaningful democratic deliberations at the national level or at least from 
effective judicial scrutiny by the independent national courts.1 These would then be two 
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1 Andreas von Staden, Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and 
Judicial Standards of Review 24, 25, Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/11. (2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969442: “the margin of appreciation …is a main example of… a democratically informed 
standard of review.”; ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY, 38 (2012): (“The strength of reasons for a margin of appreciation on the basis of 
external factors depends on one’s view of the role of the Tribunals. If one regards the Tribunals as having the primary 
role of establishing human rights standards, then it is plausible that there ought to be very little scope for a margin of 
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institutional justifications (individually and jointly) for deference and respect by an external actor 
such as the ECtHR. Viewed differently, the MoA doctrine serves as an inducement for states and 
national courts to ensure domestic democratic processes and effective judicial review and thereby 
enhance protection of rights and reduce the workload of the court.  
But this assumption is highly optimistic and does not adequately meet political reality. There are 
two flaws to that approach. The first is that the democratic processes within the state are not always 
capable of promoting adequate human rights standards. The second flaw is that national courts are 
not always capable of correcting whatever failures exist in their respective democratic systems. 
Unfortunately, the inherent flaws in the domestic democratic processes might disenfranchise 
certain groups of voters lacking adequate judicial protection at the state level. The typical 
candidates for such treatment are often the “discreet and insular minorities” – ethnic, cultural, 
religious, racial, and national. However, this is not always the case. Several minorities engage 
effectively in national politics and turn out to be highly influential, far outweighing diffuse 
majorities. The theory on collective action suggests that diffuse majorities tend to be less effective 
than organized special interests.2 And this is then another consideration for the court to take into 
account when deciding on the proper MoA in specific cases. And while courts are inclined to 
protect minorities or resolve collective action problems for diffuse majorities, they often fail to do 
so. These concerns therefore suggest that the ECtHR intervene when the democratic processes fail 
and the national courts refrain from rescuing them. This was my suggestion in 1999.3 Indeed, the 
ECtHR has recognized the need to protect minorities in its jurisprudence, even in highly sensitive 
politically scenarios.4  
Thus far, however, the debate about the MoA and its remedial function centered on the assumption 
that the causes of democratic failures were internal, namely that the decision-making processes are 
insulated from the outside. This is obviously wrong, and more so today than any other time in the 
history of the modern state. The aim of this essay is to explore the external challenges to democracy 
                                                          
appreciation to states. However, if states are important participants in the interpretation of international human rights 
standards and their application within their jurisdiction, then there may be reasons to give the state a margin of 
appreciation.” Hence the limited margin for measures that suppress political freedoms: Dean.Spielmann, Allowing the 
Right Margin: The European Court of Human 
Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine—Waiver or Subsidiarity of 
European Review. Center for European Legal Studies Working Paper, Cambridge (2012). 
2 Mancur Olson, The Theory of Collective Action (1965). See also EYAL BENVENISTI & GEORGE W. DOWNS, 
BETWEEN FRAGMENTATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2017), 
Chapter 3. 
3 Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U J. INT’L L & POL. 843, 848 
(1999). See also Eyal Benvenisti, National Courts and the International Law on Minority Rights, 2 AUSTRIAN REV. 
INT’L & EUR. L. 1 (1997). For a more recent reiteration of this point, see Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & 
Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1, 16 (2009). 
4 Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. Nos. 27996/06, 34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. For critique, see 
Christopher McCrudden & Brendan O’Leary, Courts and Consociations, or How Human Rights Courts May De-
stabilize Power-sharing Settlements, 24 EUR J. INT’L L. 477 (2013). See also Dominic Mcgoldrick, A Defence of the 
Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65 ICLQ 21, 24-25 
(2016). 
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and outline the potential responses that exist in the arsenal of the ECtHR and that can be further 
developed.  
 
2. MoA and the external failures of the political process 
Thus far, the debate about the resilience of the domestic democratic and judicial processes focused 
solely on the domestic sphere. This was myopic. Faced with challenges from external actors, it is 
unclear whether democratic deliberations at the national level can provide an equal voice to all 
citizens, and whether national courts can ensure protection against systemic failures. There is a 
misalignment between those who vote (in one country) and those who are affected by the vote (in 
another country). The voters’ choices are also bound by outside pressure wielded by international 
organizations and private actors such as MNCs. There are also the outsiders: refugees, asylum 
seekers, etc. What role does the ECtHR play in responding to such challenges? What role can the 
MoA doctrine play? 
To be able to outline the potential role of the ECtHR and the MoA doctrine in this regard, I will 
briefly describe the external failures of contemporary democracy. Domestic democratic processes 
face at least four types of challenges. These involve the relations of the voters with: (a) The 
outsiders within; (b) the outsiders without, (c) foreign public governance actors, and (d) foreign 
private actors. In this part I analyze these challenges and at the same time outline the legal 
responses that the ECtHR has offered or might be willing to offer in response. I make no effort to 
offer a full description of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the issues covered, but instead I wish to 
illustrate this court’s often inconsistent or inconclusive use of the MoA doctrine.  
 
(a) The outsiders within 
The “outsiders within” are the well-recognized group of non-nationals who are either seeking to 
enter, are already within the country, or those whom the authorities seek to deport. These include 
refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented family-members of citizens or lawful residents, or other 
non-citizens. Their concerns encompass not only the right to enter or reside but also entitlement to 
various socio-economic rights, some of them quite basic like access to education, healthcare or 
social security schemes.  
Non-nationals raise two types of challenges to democracy. The first is a traditional human rights 
challenge. The voiceless individuals who seek entry, who fear deportation, who need access to 
public resources, depend on others’ political choices. These are the immediate cases we encounter 
in the jurisprudence. And they can be regarded as an extension of the “discrete and insular” 
minority difficulty. 
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It is apparent that the ECtHR is aware of the vulnerability of non-nationals seeking entry to 
member states or rights within these states. As early as 1986, the ECtHR recognized in principle 
(and in an obiter dictum) the vulnerable status of non-nationals that merits enhanced judicial 
protection:  
“Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform, there 
may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals and non-nationals 
as far as compensation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable 
to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the 
election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, 
although a taking of property must always be effected in the public interest, different 
considerations may apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate 
reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than 
non-nationals.”5 
The ECtHR exercises strict scrutiny, with no MoA, in cases of migrants seeking entry in dire 
situations such as in the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy,6 or those whose deportation to other countries 
could expose them to torture like in the case of Chahal v. The United Kingdom.7 Notably, the court 
did not invoke the MoA doctrine when finding for the applicants in most – but not all – of these 
cases.8 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, concerning the expulsion by Belgian authorities of asylum 
seekers to Greece, the ECtHR found violations of the Convention.9 The Court “attache[d] 
considerable importance to the applicant’s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a 
particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection. It 
note[d] the existence of a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this 
need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities 
of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive.”10 Note that the court 
compared the asylum seekers to the Roma minority (referring “mutatis mutandis” to Oršuš and 
Others v. Croatia 11). The court did not resort to the MoA doctrine, and also in light of the specific 
                                                          
5 James & others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, § 63, 1986 Eur. Ct. H.R., 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57507 (my emphasis). 
6 Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
7 Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 1996, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
8 In Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, § 39, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R., the court criticized the separation of the 
applicant who had a criminal record from his wife as a violation of Article 8 of the Convention: “The Court recalls 
that the Convention does not guarantee the right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country. However, the 
removal of a person from a country where close members of his family are living may amount to an infringement of 
the right to respect for family life.” The court determined that the interference was not proportionate to the aim 
pursued, without invoking the MoA. In Tuquabo-Tekle v. The Netherlands, App. no. 60665/00, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R., 
the court mentions the MoA but endorses the migrants’ claims.  
9 M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
10 Id, at § 251. 
11 Oršuš & others v. Croatia (GC), App. No. 15766/03, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 7 (2010). 
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violation, reiterated that “expulsion to another country [that] will expose an individual to treatment 
prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention requires close and rigorous scrutiny.”12  
When dealing with socio-economic rights with respect to which states are usually entitled to a 
wide MoA, the court nevertheless interfered when it found discrimination against non-nationals, 
and held that discrimination against non-nationals must be based on “very weighty reasons.”13 
Most recently, the ECtHR included HIV positive individuals who were seeking residence permits 
in the context of family unification among the “particularly vulnerable group[s] in society that 
ha[ve] suffered significant discrimination in the past,” and therefore requiring that “the State’s 
margin of appreciation [be] substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for 
imposing the restrictions in question.”14 
In Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, Russian nationals without permanent residence permits alleged that 
they had been discriminated against since, unlike Bulgarian nationals and certain categories of 
aliens, they had been required to pay fees in order to pursue their secondary education. 15 The court 
asserted that while “[t]he States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to 
what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment,” and in 
particular, “the States are usually allowed a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to general 
measures of economic or social strategy,” “very weighty reasons would have to be put forward 
                                                          
12 In M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, the court does acknowledge that subject to “a certain margin of appreciation [that 
is] left to the States, conformity with Article 13 requires that the competent body must be able to examine the substance 
of the complaint and afford proper reparation.” 
13 Gaygusuz v. Austria, App. No. 17371/90, § 42, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R; See LIENEKE SLINGENBERG, THE RECEPTION OF 
ASYLUM SEEKERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 195-212 (2014). 
14 Novruk & Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/13 & 13817/14, § 100, 2016 Eur. Ct. 
H.R.: “If a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society that has suffered 
significant discrimination in the past, then the State’s margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must 
have very weighty reasons for imposing the restrictions in question. The reason for this approach, which questions 
certain classifications per se, is that such groups were historically subject to prejudice, with lasting consequences 
resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice could entail legislative stereotyping which prohibits the 
individualised evaluation of their capacities and needs … The Court has found that people living with HIV have to 
face a whole host of problems, not only medical but also professional, social, personal and psychological, and to 
confront deeply rooted prejudice even from among highly educated people …. The prejudice was born out of 
ignorance about the routes of transmission of HIV/Aids, and has stigmatised and marginalised those who live with the 
virus. Consequently, the Court has held that people living with HIV are a vulnerable group and that the State should 
be afforded only a narrow margin of appreciation in choosing measures that single out this group for differential 
treatment on account of their health status.” 
15 Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, App. No. 5335/05, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. See also Gaygusuz, supra note 13, at § 45: A 
retired Turkish national denied unemployment insurance under the law because of his lack of Austrian nationality. No 
reference was made to MoA: “The Austrian Government submitted that the statutory provision in question was not 
discriminatory. They argued that the difference in treatment was based on the idea that the State has special 
responsibility for its own nationals and must take care of them and provide for their essential needs. Moreover, sections 
33 and 34 of the Unemployment Insurance Act laid down certain exceptions to the nationality condition. Lastly, at the 
material time, Austria was not bound by any contractual obligation to grant emergency assistance to Turkish 
nationals.”; Gaygusuz, supra note 13, at § 50: “the difference in treatment between Austrians and non-Austrians as 
regards entitlement to emergency assistance, of which Mr Gaygusuz was a victim, is not based on any "objective and 
reasonable justification”; Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Gaygusuz Revisited: The Limits of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Equality Agenda, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 689 (2012). 
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before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of 
nationality as compatible with the Convention.”16  
In the case of Luczak v. Poland, a French national of Polish origin, who moved to Poland requested 
to be admitted to the farmers' social security scheme, but was denied admission on the grounds 
that he was not a Polish national.17 The court found “that the Government have [sic] not adduced 
any reasonable and objective justification for the distinction such as to meet the requirements of 
Article 14 of the Convention, even having regard to their margin of appreciation in the area of 
social security.”18  
A different approach was suggested in Bah v. the UK.19 With respect to a petition of an asylum 
seeker from Sierra Leone who sought permission to stay with her son in social housing that was in 
short supply, the court reiterated its position concerning nationality as a ground for exclusion, it 
added “[b]ecause of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities 
are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest 
on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature’s policy choice 
unless it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation.”20 The court also distinguished between 
nationality and immigration status as suspected grounds for distinction.21 
The general observation from these and other cases is that the ECtHR adequately refrains from 
relying on the MoA doctrine or limits its scope with respect to non-nationals. The reliance on the 
domestic democratic process seems indeed improper in such instances. 
The question is whether the same scrutiny should be exercised in other instances concerning non-
nationals who are affected by state policies, a question to which I turn now.  
(b) The outsiders without 
                                                          
16 Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, supra note 15, at § 52. 
17 Luczak v. Poland, App. No. 77782/01, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
18 Id, at § 59. 
19 Bah v. United Kingdom, App. No. 56328/07, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.: “Because of their direct knowledge of their society 
and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is 
in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature’s policy choice 
unless it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation” (see Stec & Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 65731/01 
and 65900/01, § 52, ECHR 2006-VI).” 
20 Bah v. United Kingdom, at § 37. 
21 Id, at § 47: “The Court notes that the nature of the status upon which differential treatment is based weighs heavily 
in determining the scope of the margin of appreciation to be accorded to Contracting States. … immigration status is 
not an inherent or immutable personal characteristic such as sex or race, but is subject to an element of choice. … 
Given the element of choice involved in immigration status, therefore, while differential treatment based on this 
ground must still be objectively and reasonably justifiable, the justification required will not be as weighty as in the 
case of a distinction based, for example, on nationality. Furthermore, given that the subject matter of this case – the 
provision of housing to those in need – is predominantly socio-economic in nature, the margin of appreciation 
accorded to the Government will be relatively wide.” 
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Current global interdependencies are responsible for the lack of alignment between the group that 
has the right to vote and the group affected by the decisions made by, or on behalf of, the first 
group. The basic assumption of state democracy—that these two types of stakeholders overlap—
was perhaps correct in the world of separate mansions, when territorial boundaries defined not 
only the persons entitled to vote but also the community affected by those choices. Because of that 
relative alignment, exclusive state sovereignty was both efficient and democratically just.22 Today, 
the policies of one government – on matters such as land development and environmental 
protection, affect foreign stakeholders on a regular basis; however, without the latter having the 
right to vote for that government or otherwise being able to influence its decisions. The domestic 
political process becomes irrelevant as a way to secure wider community goals. This outcome 
requires polities to take into account the interests of outsiders when making decisions affecting 
them.23 An illustrative case of such an “other-regarding” perspective is the Council of the 
European Union v. Front Polisario,24 where the Court of Justice of the European Union limited 
the spatial scope of the trade agreement between the EU and Morocco so as not to impact the 
inhabitants of the region of Western Sahara that is occupied by Morocco. 
 
Voters in one state indirectly shape the democratic processes in other countries also by defining 
the permeability of their own borders. By determining the right (and the opportunities) of outsiders 
(and outsiders’ capital) to enter, they indirectly shape the nature of politics and the relative political 
power of voters in another country. Therefore, following Albert Hirschman’s insight,25 the entry 
and exit rights that the ECHR ensures indirectly shape people’s life opportunities not only in the 
member states but also in other countries. Since democracy thrives on the collective action of its 
many members, and in fact is constantly defined by that activity,26 it is possible that excessive 
exiting would harm the community due to under-investment by those who have alternatives.27 We 
can conclude that for a democracy to flourish within states, there must be an optimal level of exit 
options, not too few, not too many, which available on an equal basis among voters. For the same 
reason, there must be an optimal level of entry options, not overly restrictive, not completely 
                                                          
22 This is a matter of degree of course, cross-border influence always existed.  
23 Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013). 
24 Case C‑ 104/16 P, 21 December, 2016. 
25 ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). 
26 See also JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Henry Regnery Co., 1962) 
(1861) 83.: "[I]t is from political discussion and collective political action that one whose daily occupations 
concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow-citizens, and becomes 
consciously a member of a great community.” 
27 As Mill observed (id.), democracy is the way the community forms itself. We sometimes notice this aspect when 
talking about “brain drain”. See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive 
Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006); Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and 
Global Race for Talent, 120 YALE L.J. 2098 (2011). 
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closed, which must be non-discriminatory. Without opportunities for entry, the right to exit is 
meaningless, 28 and vice versa.  
By necessity, the ECHR regulates at least partly the interface of exit and entry to and from member 
states and also to and from Europe. It ensures the rights of exit and entry at least for some types of 
individuals. Although in general, international law recognizes states’ wide discretion to allow 
entry, that discretion is subject to the recognition of the right of exit and the right of entry as 
individual human rights. This in itself is significant for the individuals’ voice also in their countries 
of origin. To the extent that individuals can rely on their combined exit and entry rights, their voice 
is secured as compared to a situation where the ruling regime knows that their options to leave the 
country are limited. The availability of these rights shapes the voice that right-holders have (or do 
not have) in their respective countries.  
The ways by which one European member state affects individuals and democratic processes 
within other European member states, or individuals in non-member states, of course raises 
questions related to the spatial scope of the Convention. According to Article 1, the Convention 
requires states to secure Convention rights “to everyone within their jurisdiction.”29 While an 
exploration of this concept is beyond the scope of this essay, I should point out one relevant aspect. 
In light of the misalignment that potentially affects foreign stakeholders, to the extent that they 
access domestic decision-making venues to voice their concerns, they come “within the 
jurisdiction” of the state, and their rights to a proper hearing, to transparent decision-making etc. 
must be respected. Arguably, the decision to allow them to come “within the jurisdiction” either 
in person or by proxy to voice their concern should also be respected. As strangers to the local 
processes, resorting to the MoA cannot be grounded by the deference-to-democracy argument. 
 
(c) The insiders and global governance bodies 
In recent years, state authorities have been delegating or surrendering regulatory discretion to a 
fragmented tapestry of various forms of public and private, formal and informal, international and 
private entities.30 The pressure to privatize has further minimized the space for political 
deliberation,31 and all too often the transition to such global regulatory entities has to varying 
degrees eroded the functionality of public participation in politics, traditional constitutional checks 
and balances found in many democracies, as well as other domestic oversight and monitoring 
                                                          
28 Jeremy Waldron, Exclusion: Property Analogies in the Immigration Debate, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 
269 (1027). 
29 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, art. 1. 
30 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014), Chapter 2.  
31 Doreen Lustig & Eyal Benvenisti, The Multinational Corporation as “the Good Despot”: The Democratic Costs of 
Privatization in Global Settings, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 125 (2014). 
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mechanisms of executive discretion.32 With global regulation becoming ubiquitous, heavily 
influenced by special domestic interest groups that thrive on asymmetric information, the question 
of voice in global entities arises. Furthermore, the voice of diffuse voters in domestic bodies 
diminishes. This is due to the fact that the states’ ability to resist the foreign actor is effectively 
lost because a discrete group of states finds it impossible to unite against a common external rival 
– a powerful foreign state or an even mightier and more ruthless MNC – that practices “divide and 
rule” strategies against them, while imposing its demands on them.  
 
The ECtHR can be the forum that unites the member states against the foreign power. Facing such 
challenges, the MoA doctrine should be narrow rather than wide, not only for protecting rights, 
but for democracy’s sake. The ECtHR, like other international tribunals, can help resolve the 
collective action problems of states that are unable to overcome the “sovereignty trap,” and rebuff 
the demands made by a powerful state or a multinational company that seeks to force the weaker 
state to comply with their demands.33 The ECtHR has been quite successful in this context, in 
offering resistance to international organizations that sought immunity from national labor laws 
by insisting on the availability of “reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their 
rights.”34 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was able to insist that global sporting associations 
comply with European legal standards that protect the rights of athletes,35 and, of course, to resist 
the mighty UN Security Council in Kadi.36  
The ECtHR has been relatively more timid in this respect. The court was willing to impose duties 
indirectly on international organizations that acted as employers in the member states. In the 
celebrated Waite and Kennedy judgment,37 the court emphasized the state’s duty to ensure that its 
citizens’ rights were respected by employers who were international organizations: 
                                                          
32 Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and 
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211 (2014) (discussing strategies to address the evolving gaps in the efficacy of 
domestic political and legal mechanisms of participation and accountability resulting from shifts of regulatory 
authority from domestic to global regulatory bodies). See also Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 2 (arguing that by 
employing international organizations as venues for policymaking, state executives and interest groups manage to 
reduce the impact of domestic checks and balances); There may be additional reasons for the concentration of power 
in the executive and the decline of domestic checks. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) (discussing what he sees are the (domestic) factors that lead to the rise of an unchecked 
U.S. presidency).  
33 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Premises, Assumptions, and Implications of Van Gend en Loos: 
Viewed From the Perspectives of Democracy and Legitimacy of International Institutions, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 85, 96 
(2014). 
34 Waite & Kennedy, App. No. 26083/94, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
35 Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991; Case C-415/93, URBSFA v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 
I-4921. In these cases, the ECJ was able to resolve the collective action problem created when private sports 
associations imposed their standards on individual states. 
36 Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 
2008 E.C.R I–6351. 
37 Waite & Kennedy, supra note 34, at § 67. 
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“The Court is of the opinion that where States establish international organisations in order 
to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they 
attribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them immunities, there 
may be implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible 
with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States were 
thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of 
activity covered by such attribution. It should be recalled that the Convention is intended 
to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective. 
This is particularly true for the right of access to the courts in view of the prominent place 
held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial […]” 
The court rejected the application on the grounds that their employer had provided “reasonable 
alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention.”38 The court recognized 
the German labor courts’ MoA in balancing the “proper functioning of international organisations” 
against the rights of their employees. Note that this is the MoA that the domestic courts have, 
rather than the European court’s. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether such deference is called for, 
given the pressure on the domestic courts to remain “IO friendly” to promote the domestic 
economy. 
But in the case of Nada, involving the UNSC’s “smart sanctions,” the court failed to offer a similar 
steadfast position, and put the MoA doctrine center stage: 
“In any event, the final evaluation of whether the interference is necessary remains subject 
to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention […] A 
margin of appreciation must be left to the competent national authorities in this connection. 
The breadth of this margin varies and depends on a number of factors including the nature 
of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual, the nature of the 
interference and the object pursued by the interference.”39 
In Al Dulimi, no doubt inspired by Kadi, the MoA is already attenuated. Although the MoA was 
mentioned rather abstractly (“the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation” with 
                                                          
38 Id. at § 73. 
39 Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08, § 184, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R.; See also §185: “In order to address the question 
whether the measures taken against the applicant were proportionate to the legitimate aim that they were supposed to 
pursue, and whether the reasons given by the national authorities were “relevant and sufficient”, the Court must 
examine whether the Swiss authorities took sufficient account of the particular nature of his case and whether they 
adopted, in the context of their margin of appreciation, the measures that were called for in order to adapt the sanctions 
regime to the applicant’s individual situation.” (Ironically, the Swiss court found that Switzerland had no MoA to 
implement UNSC resolutions). 
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respect to limitations on the right of access to a court),40 the court found a violation without 
mentioning the doctrine.41 
 
(d) The insiders and foreign private actors 
There are two types of foreign private actors: actual and virtual. By virtual I mean local actors that 
reinvent themselves as foreign by creating foreign-based companies. As a result, foreign or locally-
based multinational corporations evade political boundaries with their regulatory regimes and tax 
obligations. With these “freedoms” of movement and incorporation, by increasing the real or 
virtual exit options of owners (and of their capital or income thereof) they also increase the owners’ 
voice in all relevant jurisdictions, lower their incentives to contribute to the welfare of the 
community, while at the same time diminishing the voice of those whose exit options are more 
limited as well as their means of promoting community goals.  
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, actual and virtual private actors can also extort host or potentially 
host states. The response can be two-pronged: limiting privatization; and expanding duties of 
private actors that function as public ones, including employers etc. The Waite and Kennedy 
rationale applies here as well, and other arguments in that vein have been pursued.42 And, to the 
extent that states intervene and impose, the MoA should be narrow, not wide. 
The ECtHR has made some steps in this direction, mainly by imposing human rights duties on 
private employers, but it invariably invoked the MoA doctrine in this context.43 The fact that the 
                                                          
40 Al-Dulimi & Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, App. No. 5809/08, §124, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
41 See also Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98), § 149, 2005 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (measures adopted by the EU): “Since the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is to be 
construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the opening sentence of that Article, there must exist a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised: the Court 
must determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest in this respect and 
the interest of the individual company concerned. In so determining, the Court recognises that the State enjoys a wide 
margin of appreciation with regard to the means to be employed and to the question of whether the consequences are 
justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the objective pursued…” 
42 See BENVENISTI, supra note 30, at 145-50. 
43 Young, James & Webster v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 7601/76; 7806/77, § 65, 1981 Eur. Ct. H.R.: “Having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, the detriment suffered by Mr. Young, Mr. James and Mr. Webster went 
further than was required to achieve a proper balance between the conflicting interests of those involved and cannot 
be regarded as proportionate to the aims being pursued. Even making due allowance for a State’s "margin of 
appreciation" (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned Sunday Times judgment, p. 36, par. 59), the Court thus finds that 
the restrictions complained of were not "necessary in a democratic society", as required by paragraph 2 of Article 11 
(art. 11-2).”; Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen (Aslef) v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11002/05, 
§ 52, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R.: “Accordingly, in the absence of any identifiable hardship suffered by Mr Lee or any abusive 
and unreasonable conduct by the applicant, the Court concludes that the balance has not been properly struck and that 
the case falls outside any acceptable margin of appreciation.”; Olha Cherednychenko, Towards the Control of Private 
Acts by the European Court of Human Rights?, 13 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. L. 195, 210 (2006): “In virtually every 
case in which the issue of positive obligations has arisen, the Court has reiterated that ‘especially where positive 
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court is insensitive to the democracy dimension of private property can be seen in its judgment 
concerning freedom of speech in a private mall. The court granted primacy to the property right of 
the mall owner.44 
 
3. Should the ECtHR correct all democratic deficits? 
The previous part of this essay identified external pressures on domestic democracies. These are 
pressures to which the court should pay attention, and examine whether and how it can secure and 
amplify the voice of the disadvantaged individuals. In this connection, two issues arise. One is 
normative: whether foreigners of all types should benefit from the same protection under the 
convention as citizens. The second is institutional: should the ECtHR preempt the political process 
by imposing its own views on the proper balancing of interests and rights of non-nationals and 
nationals, of persons and MNCs, etc. There is much to be said on these normative questions, and 
I have done so elsewhere.45 In the context of this essay, the relevant discussion is whether these 
two normative questions are to be left to the discretion of the member states, through the 
recognition by the court of a wide MoA to the democratic processes within member states, or 
should these questions be decided by the court, or at least mediated by it, in which case no or 
limited MoA is called for. 
The above discussion suggests that in view of the external challenges to democracy, a MoA 
approach exposes not only asylum seekers but most individuals to inadequate or impoverished 
domestic democratic processes. The contemporary pressures on states suggest that the MoA will 
benefit those who can participate effectively in politics and governance while failing to reflect the 
preferences of others. 
I wish to argue that the ECHR should be interpreted as a collective agreement to remedy also the 
external sources of democratic failures facing member states. In addition to the internal challenges 
on democracy (the relative weakness of discrete and insular minorities, or capture of the political 
branches by powerful lobbies), these include three types of challenges. The first type are external 
pressures wielded by foreign actors. These are the coercive demands by public organizations and 
MNCs. Having the Convention and its court on guard against such challenges does not entail any 
cost for the member states; on the contrary: a collective position that a central actor such as the 
                                                          
obligations ... are concerned ... the requirements [on the state] will vary considerably from case to case ...’ and that 
‘this is an area in which the Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be 
taken to ensure compliance with the Convention ...’. The wide margin of appreciation has also been stressed by the 
ECtHR in the context of those cases in which the imposition of the positive obligations on the State had given rise to 
the need to strike a balance between the competing private interests.” 
44 Appleby & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44306/98, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
45 See Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity, supra note 23; Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 2, Chapter 7. 
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court can impose can resolve the collective action problem and be beneficial to the majority of 
voters in all member states.  
The second type of pressure involves those that member states impose on each other, such as 
spillover effects from one member state to another, or “race to the bottom” policies that are aimed, 
for example, at making life miserable for asylum seekers so that they continue their journey to 
neighboring countries. A collective decision, for example, on increasing the opportunities for 
citizens of neighboring countries to voice their concerns in public hearings before policies that 
affect them adversely are adopted, is beneficial to all. Similarly, standards for minimal treatment 
of asylum seekers that encompass conditions for family unification and socio-economic rights 
could offset state policies that attempt to burden their neighbors with the asylum seekers that live 
in their midst. Having the ECtHR as a guardian against shirking can, also here, be beneficial to 
most voters.  
The third type of challenge is the one that each of the member states pose to communities and 
individuals who are outside the Council of Europe, for example by creating “brain drain” in foreign 
countries, or by causing environmental damage (beyond the obvious exercise of police or military 
power, where no margin is recognized). Arguably, this type of challenge can hardly be reconciled 
with the rather basic goals of the ECHR that were stated by the outset, but these goals evolve and 
there are, in my view, solid normative reasons to adopt them as a collective goal of the members 
of the ECHR that requires common positions.  
 
4. From MoA to Subsidiarity 
Protocol No. 1546 introduces the principle of subsidiarity into the ECHR legal system. Compared 
with the nebulous MoA, the principle of subsidiarity provides a rationale for deference. As 
articulated by the Treaty on the European Union (Article 5(3)) “[u]nder the principle of 
subsidiarity… the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives or the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at the regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.” 
This rationale addresses directly the democratic challenges this essay addressed. It is sensitive to 
the sphere where public decisions should be taken. The concept of subsidiarity therefore, complex 
and difficult to apply as it is,47 provides a clearer approach for thinking about how to protect 
individuals whose rights and opportunities are shaped by public decisions in foreign venues. The 
ECtHR is in a position to enhance the functioning of the domestic political and legal infrastructure 
                                                          
46 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Protocol No. 15), 24.VI.2013. 
47 See Paul Craig, Subsidiarity, a Political and Legal Analysis, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15/2012. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028332. 
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that protects individual rights. By eschewing its deferential approach to collective challenges and 
adopting a more rigorous one, it will not only fulfil its mission, but also potentially reduce its 
caseload because the domestic units would operate more resolutely to prevent harm to the 
voiceless. Therefore, Protocol 15 should take over much of the space covered thus far by the MoA 
doctrine. 
The recent jurisprudence of the court suggests that the court has indeed seized the new rationale 
for qualified deference to the political process by examining closely the quality of the 
parliamentary process that has led to the policy in question. As Robert Spano, a judge at the 
ECtHR pointed out, Protocol 15 and the Brighton Declaration “have ... created an important 
incentive for the Court in recent years to develop a more robust and coherent concept of 
subsidiarity.”48 In light of this concept the court deferred to what it identified as an “extensive 
examination by [the UK] Parliament, … the cross-party support for the Act as well as the in-
depth analysis of the compatibility of the Act with the Convention, conducted by the domestic 
courts.”49 This “qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach,” allows the court to seize the 
principle of subsidiarity to properly address the internal democratic deficits that may arise in the 
member states. 50 What remains to be seen is to what extent the same subsidiarity approach will 
be used by the court to protect the interests of those outsiders to the democratic system, thereby 
correcting the external failures of the domestic democratic processes that this essay sought to 
clarify. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As Sabino Cassese has written, “[t]he process of globalization of human rights has witnessed, and 
will continue to witness, tensions between national governments and supranational bodies. 
However, [the EctHR] cannot reduce its efforts to set global brakes to, and controls over, national 
democracies. Over time, these display ever more faults and “lacunae,” as they are instruments that 
are far from perfect.”51 
The MoA doctrine remains a useful doctrine for the court to manage its judicial authority, 52 like 
other “avoidance doctrines” such as non-justiciability or the political question doctrine. It has the 
                                                          
48 Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?: Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity, 14 HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 487, 491 (2014). 
49 Id., at 498. 
50 See also Matthew Saul, The European Court of Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of 
National Parliaments, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 745 (2015). 
51 Sabino Cassese, Ruling Indirectly: Judicial Subsidiarity in the ECHR, Paper for the Seminar on “Subsidiarity: a 
double sided coin?, 30 January 2015, Strasbourg. 
52 Shai Dothan, In Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the European Court of Human Rights, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. 
INT’L COMP. L. 508, 515 (2014): “As these interpretive choices demonstrate, the ECHR has clearly favored expansive 
interpretation over restrictive interpretation. Yet there are limits to the willingness of the ECHR to expand the 
obligations of the states. The ECHR is limited by the text of the Convention—it can interpret the text but it cannot 
revise the text or bend it to reach any result it wishes. Furthermore, the object of the Convention is not to protect every 
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qualities of the accordion, and thus can be contracted or released ad-hoc to fit almost any set of 
factors. As Julian Arato notes, “It allows the Court to ensure that the Convention remains 
responsive to material changes in the legal, political, and social circumstances of greater Europe 
and beyond.”53 In the context of outsiders to the democratic process, it could also be judicially 
useful. Ultimately, many of these questions, particularly those related to asylum seekers, are highly 
divisive, and popular backlash against over-demanding judgments can be expected. As Joseph 
Weiler has written with respect to the ECJ’s treatment of non-EC nationals, “[t]his area is a 
political mine field in which Governmental reaction to 'judicial meddling' may be particularly 
harsh… As part of the phenomenology of judging, this is an area which may have appeared to be 
not sufficiently important to 'spend judicial capital', measured in the coin of credibility and 
legitimacy, which is involved each time a court breaks with the past and makes a new 
development.”54  
The MoA doctrine could serve as a lubricant on the wheels of change, insisting less when tensions 
are particularly high. But for that to occur, the doctrine must be acknowledged as having this 
modest role, a signal that there are limits to enforcing the rule of law, rather than being celebrated 
as the epitome of democracy. 
 
                                                          
right, and protecting rights is not its only purpose. The ECHR also considers the interests of states and defers to some 
of their decisions by granting them a so called "margin of appreciation". Moreover, the ECHR often invokes the 
"principle of proportionality". According to this principle states are allowed to infringe rights enshrined in the 
Convention if other legitimate interests of proportionate weight necessitate this infringement, and if this infringement 
doesn't impair the essence of the protected right..” 
53 Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 545, 565-70 (2014): 
“the Court gives states a wider or narrower space of deference depending on the Convention provision in question – 
taking into consideration the context and importance of the interests at issue… Moreover, the margin varies over time. 
The Court augments the size of the member states’ margin of appreciation under certain conditions… the Court has 
proven willing to revisit the scope of the margin in view of the convalescence of external rules of international law 
relating to the particular issue — a respect the Court has extended not only to other rules of international law binding 
on the parties to the Convention, but also to norms binding on only some of them, unratified treaties, treaties signed 
by only some of the parties, and even intrinsically nonbinding “soft law” instruments.” 
54 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-
EC Nationals - A Critique, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 65, 70 (1992). 
 
